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Abstract
The article features a temporal approach to modelling the social
impact of Western colonialism. We collect a data set for all former
colonies and dependencies that are regarded as countries today (143
observations). Our data, as well as existing theory, suggest that the
very heterogeneous era of colonization might be divided into an early
’mercantilist’ wave and a much later ’imperialist’ wave with quite dif-
ferent characteristics. We demonstrate that a commonly used deter-
minant of institutional quality - colonial settler mortality - had a much
weaker eﬀect on institutional outcomes during the imperialist scramble
for Africa. When we broaden the analysis, it is shown that the positive
eﬀect of colonial duration on democracy is strongest among countries
colonized during the imperialist era. Controlling for colonial duration,
our results further indicate that a long history of statehood is bad for
democracy while there is almost no eﬀect of the national identity of
the colonizer.
Keywords: colonialism, democracy, institutions, development,
settler mortality.
JEL Codes: N40, N50, P33.
1 Introduction
The legacy of Western colonialism still exerts a significant influence on com-
munities around the world. The great wave of independencies from colonial
rule happened more than four decades ago but many scholars still claim to
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observe strong indications of lingering colonial or even neo-colonial patterns.
For instance, the debt crisis in the 1980s and the structural adjustment pro-
grams that followed were by some regarded as a return to older systems
of Western domination. In the economics literature, seminal works such
as North (1990), Hall and Jones (1999), Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000),
and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (henceforth AJR) (2001, 2002) trace
the fundamental reason for persistent underdevelopment and stagnant eco-
nomic growth back to weak institutions that countries inherited from colo-
nial times. A new research agenda on the social impact of colonialism has
recently appeared that builds on this tradition.1
The backbone of this article is the notion that the timing of colonial
activities during the last half millennium is crucial for our understanding of
its long-run social impact. Our ultimate dependent variable is institutional
quality rather than economic performance. A number of existing works have
already established a strong link between institutions and income levels. We
attempt to provide three broad contributions to the literature: Firstly, to
present a ’universal’ sample of all former and existing Western colonies that
currently are regarded as countries in the World Bank statistics. Our sam-
ple, by far the largest in the literature, includes 143 such countries with
dates of colonization and independence and a specified founding event. A
qualitative and quantitative conclusion from this section, which indeed con-
firms what several other works have suggested, is that the extremely het-
erogeneous era of Western colonization nonetheless might be divided into
an early ’mercantilist’ wave and a much later ’imperialist’ wave with quite
diﬀerent characteristics.
Secondly, exploiting the dimensions of temporal heterogeneity developed
above, we focus on one particular determinant of institutional quality that
has rendered a great deal of attention in the literature: AJR:s (2001) famous
measure of settler mortality. It is shown that whereas disease environment
appears to have had a strong impact on institutional development during
the early mercantilist era of colonization, it had a statistically diﬀerent and
often insignificant eﬀect on African countries and on countries colonized
after 1850 in the aftermath of a revolution in tropical medicine.
Thirdly, we carry out a general investigation of the eﬀect of colonial du-
1See for instance the empirical works by Grier (1999), Bertocchi and Canova (2002),
Rodrik et al (2004), Lange (2004), Banerjee and Iyer (2005), and Albouy (2006).
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ration on two types of institutions that have received a particular attention
in the literature; the level of democracy and the strength of the rule of law.
The most important findings are that whereas there appears to be a general
concave relationship between years spent under colonial rule and democracy,
the duration of colonialism has a robust positive eﬀect among countries col-
onized during the most intense period of imperialism after 1850. The level
of democracy further appears to have a u-shaped association with the rule of
law. When the timing of colonialism is controlled for, the national identity
of the colonizer does not seem to be a strong determinant of institutional
strength which suggests to us that it is not so much the diﬀerent colonial
policies of for instance the Spanish and the British that explain the varition
in institutional outcomes but rather the circumstance that British colonies
were mostly created in a generally more civilized and enlightened imperialist
era.
Our work is related to a huge number of books and articles, all of which
can not be reviewed here. Our major argument about two distinct waves
of colonization, as well as our working definition of a colony, are inspired
by Osterhammel’s (2005) excellent survey of colonial theory, Curtin’s (1989,
1998) important research on colonialism and medical history, Fieldhouse’s
(1984) and Pakenham’s (1991) accounts of the imperialist era, to name a few
works. Several other research projects in economics have gathered extensive
colonial samples - for instance Grier (1999), AJR (2001), and Feyrer and
Sacerdote (2006) - but no other article has, to our knowledge, explicitly
attempted to track all former colonies in the world and identify founding
events. We hope that our sample therefore might serve as a reference for
future empirical work on colonialism.
Recent research on colonialism has mainly investigated two basic hy-
potheses: Firstly, the geography and endowments-view, proposing that colo-
nial institutions were strongly aﬀected by the disease environment (AJR,
2001), by pre-colonial population densities and levels of urbanization (AJR,
2002), and (in the Americas) by the potential for sugar plantations and min-
ing (Sokoloﬀ and Engermann, 2000). This literature shows convincingly that
where settler mortality was high due to tropical diseases, where there was an
abundance of lootable minerals, and where a dense population could easily
be exploited, Western colonists tended to install ’extractive’, rent seeking
institutions with weak private property rights that were harmful for long-run
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development.
In the second national origins-hypothesis, diﬀerences in colonial policy
are attributed to the legal systems and the diﬀerent national ideologies of the
colonizing countries. La Porta et al (1999) as well as Djankov et al (2003)
place particular emphasis on the legal tradition of the colonizer, in particular
the important diﬀerence between common law (British tradition) and civil
law (French tradition). It is argued that the former legal tradition has proved
to be more conducive to strong property rights and constraints against the
executive than the latter. North (1990), Grier (1999), and Lange et al (2006)
consider the diﬀerent ideologies of the Spanish and the British colonists and
argue that typical British colonial institutions - typically featuring freedom
from expropriation and a preference for free trade - have been central for
economic development.
In this article, we focus instead on the temporal dimension of coloniza-
tion. We argue that while both the geography and the national origins
hypotheses give important insights about the process of institutional devel-
opment, they need to be complemeted with a more comprehensive theory of
the importance of the timing of colonialism. Our results indicate that when
the timing of colonialism is accounted for, the disease environment is shown
to have a very heterogeneous eﬀect before and after 1850 and the impact
of national origin dummies more or less disappears. Temporal aspects, such
as the eﬀects of colonial duration on economic growth and income levels,
have previously been studied in smaller samples by Grier (1999), Bertocchi
and Canova (2002), Price (2003), and Feyrer and Sacerdote (2006).2 The
latter working paper also analyzes the eﬀect of colonialism during diﬀerent
eras, but its dependent variable is economic development rather than in-
stitutional quality. Their sample of about 80 island observations - many of
which are islands within the same country - is further very diﬀerent from our
cross-country sample. The general tendency in both Grier (1999) and Feyrer
and Sacerdote (2006) that the duration of colonialism has been favorable for
economic development, is well in line with our results of a positive eﬀect of
imperialist colonialism on institutions.
The article is structured as follows: In section two, we present our sample
2Bertocchi and Canova (2002) also recognize the very large diﬀerences between Ameri-
can and African colonization and therefore restrict their analysis to the relatively homoge-
nous era of African colonization.
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of 143 colonies and the methodology used for collecting the data. In section
three, we discuss whether Western colonialism can be regarded as one great
historical experiment. In section four, we test for temporal heterogeneity in
the eﬀects of settler mortality on institutions. In section five, we analyze
the general determinants of democracy and rule of law, whereas section six
provides a longer interpretation of the results. Section seven concludes.
2 The colony sample
Previous cross-country studies on the social and economic eﬀects of Western
colonization have tended to use very diﬀerent data. Table 1 gives an overview
of previous studies. Most works carry out cross-country investigations and
the number of observations in theses studies range from 33 British colonies in
Lange (2004) to 103 colonies in Rodrik et (2004).3 Banerjee and Iyer (2005)
collect a data base on 166 Indian districts. The most original database is
Feyrer and Sacerdote’s (2006) use of data from 80 islands, some of which
are countries (like Barbados) whereas many observations are islands within
island countries (like Efate within the island country Vanuatu).
Judging by the heterogeneity among the previous samples in table 1,
there appears to be a risk of sample selection bias in the existing literature.
In any case, it is very hard to make a comparison of inference when samples
diﬀer to this extent. Since our aim is to investigate the general determinants
of institutional choice among all former colonies, it is of central importance
to get as close to the universal sample of Western colonies as possible. To
do so, we need to clarify how a colony is defined. We use the following
definition, which is a modified variant of that in Osterhammel (2005, p 10):
Definition 1 A Western colony is a new and lasting political organization
created outside Europe by Western countries (countries in Europe exclud-
ing Russia but including the Western oﬀshoots United States, Australia,
New Zealand, and Canada) from the 15th to the 20th centuries through
either invasion and conquest, and/or settlement colonization, but built on
pre-colonial conditions. Its rulers are in sustained dependence on a geo-
graphically remote mother country or imperial center that claims exclusive
3The base sample in the latter article contains 79 such countries with data on settler
mortality.
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rights of possession of the colony or in other ways strongly dominate politics
in the country.
Using this definition means that we restrict our sample in a number of
ways (see the Data Appendix for a presentation of the data). The time
interval specified above (the modern era) means that we disregard previ-
ous events of colonization such as the Danish settlements of Iceland and
Greenland or the Greek colonizations throughout the Mediterranean during
antiquity. It also means that we disregard the current American presence in
Iraq. The fact that we only consider Western colonies means that we do not
take into account the Japanese conquests in East Asia in the 1930s, nor the
Russian aquisitions until 1917. The requirement that the colony in question
must be dependent on a particular Western country implies that we exclude
a number of countries in the Middle East such as Syria, Iraq, and Jordan
which were ruled by Western countries in the wake of World War I on a
mandate from the League of Nations. We also exclude Ethiopia, the only
country in Africa that was never a colony.4
Most colonial powers used several diﬀerent types of colonialism. One
of the more important distinctions was between colonies and protectorates.
Full colonies were often ’possessions’ in the full meaning of the word. Alge-
ria and other French colonies were indeed considered to be parts of France.
Protectorates, on the other hand, were generally more loosely tied to the
mother country. For instance, British protectorates like Bhutan and Qatar
were at least nominally still independent but typically had to concede sub-
stantial power to the British, such as the handling of foreign aﬀairs and the
right to deploy troops in the country. In line with most of the literature, we
treat all protectorates as colonies.
Using the definition above, we have identified 143 former colonies in
the world that are now sovereign states or still dependencies and that have
entries in the World Bank statistics as countries.5 The sample includes
all countries in North, Central, and South America, all countries in Africa
except Ethiopia, all countries in South Asia except Thailand, most Pacific
4 Italy occupied the country during 1936-41, but this did not result in a lasting colonial
administration. Bertocchi and Canova also exclude Liberia, but after close consideration
we decided that its 23-year period of American domination until independence in 1847
qualifies it to be regarded as a colony.
5Our sources in this data collection have been Britannica (2006), CIA (2006), and
Nationalencyklopedien (2006).
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islands, only a few small countries in the Middle East (Bahrain, Kuwait,
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen), and no countries in Northern or
Central Asia (except Bhutan). Some of the countries in our sample are very
small and not normally included in cross-country macroeconomic studies.
The smallest countries in our sample in terms of population size for which we
have data on institutional quality include Cook islands (21,400 individuals),
Cayman islands (39,000), and the Caribbean island group Saint Kitts and
Nevis (46,000).
We have also tried to determine dates of colonization and independence
for all colonies in the sample, and the Data Appendix lists the major event
for each country that motivates using the particular year stated as the date
of colonization. Whereas the year of independence is usually quite straight-
forward, the onset of colonization is often more diﬃcult to determine. For
the very important colony of India (including Pakistan and Bangladesh),
we have chosen the year 1750 when the military campaigns of Robert Clive
made the East India Company the strongest power on the Indian peninsula.
However, the Portuguese had established trading posts already in early six-
teenth century and the country did not become a crown colony until 1858.
The colonies in West Africa are particularly hard to decide on since hundreds
of years passed between the first contact with Europeans in the fifteenth cen-
tury and the great Scramble in the 1880s. We have tried to stay close to
our definition of a colony when determining the date of colonization. In
particular, we have tried to identify a date when Western colonizers became
the major political power in the region. This date is sometimes hundreds
of years before the formal declaration of colony status, which some previous
authors have used.
Regardless of the method chosen for dating major events of colonization,
it is quite clear that Western colonialism is a highly heterogeneous process
spanning more than five centuries. Figure 1 shows the dates of colonization
and independence for the 143 countries in our sample. The oldest colony
in our sample is Cape Verde, colonized by the Portuguese already in 1462,
whereas the most recently created colony is Niger in Saharan African, not
colonized in accordance with our definition until 1922. The first country to
be decolonized was the United States in 1776 whereas 17 countries, including
for instance Puerto Rico, Martinique, Guam, and French Polynesia, are still
not sovereign nations.
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Visual inspection of figure 1 suggests that there are two major clusters of
similar colonial experiences. The first cluster in the lower-left corner shows
colonies in South and Central America and in the Caribbean, created by
the Spanish but also the Portuguese from 1492 onwards and decolonized
around 1820. The second, larger cluster in the upper-right corner has its
core among African countries colonized in the late nineteenth century and
decolonized around 1960. A formal statistical cluster analysis, where we
force the software program to identify two clusters each for the dates of col-
onization and independence, establish one cluster of 62 countries colonized
between 1462-1715 and another with 81 colonies set up between 1750-1922.
Regarding independence, the equivalent groupings are 24 observations for
1776-1898 and as many as 119 observations during 1901-2002.
Figure 2 puts the time distribution of new colony formation in focus.
The figure largely conforms to the standard narrative about the diﬀerent
colonial eras. The first wave of Spanish and Portuguese colonization eﬀort
is reflected in the first peak in figure 2. Between 1502-1537, 22 new colonies
were formed in the new world and some other places (Mocambique - 1505,
Malaysia - 1511, and Sao Tomé and Principe - 1522). A primary motive for
this early ’mercantilist’ wave was the prospects of capturing gold treasures
in the Americas and to gain control of the spice trade in the Indian Ocean
(Landes, 1998). As colonial policy matured, subsequent centuries saw a
considerable number of Spanish conquistadores settling down permanently
in the acquired lands. The later part of the sixteenth century also saw the
emergence of the ’encomienda’ system of forced labor in South America
which has been discussed by several authors (Sokoloﬀ and Engerman, 2000).
The mature part of the mercantilist phase also included the establish-
ment of the Caribbean plantation economy around 1640 (Osterhammel,
2005). As figure 2 shows, the time period 1610-1660 was also a period
of intense colonization, mainly in the Caribbean and mainly by French and
British colonizers. The sugar plantations relied heavily on the mass impor-
tation of slaves from West Africa. As discussed above, the slave trade had
serious political consequences on some of the African nations in the interior,
although the white traders mostly stayed near the ocean.
Around 1750, the British East India Company consolidated their influ-
ence over the Indian provinces including Pakistan and Bangladesh. Apart
from this important development, not much happened in terms of new colony
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formation. The British abolished slavery in 1807, which substantially weak-
ened the Western powers’ interest in West Africa and in their Caribbean
holdings (Curtin, 1989). Colonization activity once again started to in-
crease as the nineteenth century progressed. However, as can be inferred
from figure 2, the great new wave did not start until 1880. During only
two decades, 40 new colonies were formed, the great majority (25) in Africa.
The ’imperialist’ race for the African continent started and received its basic
ground rules in the infamous Berlin conference of 1885.6 A relatively brief
but intense colonial epoch then proceeded during which the majority of the
world’s population lived in colonies. Massive decolonization then followed
in the wake of World War II when 98 countries in our sample attained full
independence.
3 Modelling the eﬀects of colonialism
The renewed scholarly interest in colonialism among economists essentially
stems from the notion that the colonial era had a major impact on the
evolution of economic and political institutions, which in turn (since institu-
tions tend to be persistent) strongly influence current economic performance
(North, 1981, 1990; AJR, 2001, 2002, 2005; Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2000).
To put this formally, let ZC be the quality of colonial institutions, ZP the
present quality of institutions in the post-independence era, and let Y be an
indicator of economic performance, for instance output per capita, then the
standard hypothesis in the literature is that
ZC =⇒ ZP ⇐⇒ Y.
In other words, because of institutional persistence, ZC still largely explains
ZP which in turn has a strong eﬀect on Y . However, due to reverse cau-
sation, Y also aﬀects ZP which means that we have a joint endogeneity
problem if we try to assess the relationship between the latter two vari-
ables empirically. An obvious candidate as an instrumental variable for ZP
would of course be ZC . Unfortunately, it has turned out to be very diﬃcult
to estimate ZC with any precision. The well-known solution by Hall and
Jones (1999) and AJR (2001) was to try to indentify a vector of exogenous
6See for instance Pakenham (1991) for an account of these events.
9
variables X that had a causal eﬀect on ZC but no direct impact on Y :
X =⇒ ZC =⇒ ZP ; X; Y
X in Hall and Jones (1999) contained distance from the equator and the frac-
tion of the population speaking European languages, whereas AJR (2001)
used settler mortality during colonial times as their favored candidate for
X.
If colonialism had been a perfect historical experiment, then all partici-
pating colonies i ∈ N = 143 should have been colonized at the same date t
and decolonized at the same date t+ d so that they could all be compared
at current date τ = t+ d+ f = 2002 where d is the duration of the colonial
era and f is the duration of post-colonial independence. We should further
have been able to identify a number of exogenous variables X that each had
a substantial degree of variation at the onset of the experiment and that
actually appeared to explain the variation that eventually unfolded in the
institutional quality of country i at the current date, ZPi,2002.
Of course, perfect historical experiments hardly ever exist. Most works so
far have focused on the problem of finding a suitable exogenous instrumental
variable Xt to account for the variation in colonial and current institutional
quality. We argue that in order to identify some Xt or to propose a general
theory of the institutional eﬀects of colonialism, we need to seriously consider
the fact that t, d, and f have been very far from uniform across colonies. As
Figure 1 shows, the typical colony in the New World - created during the
mercantilist wave - has scores like t = 1525, d = 300, and f = 177, whereas
the same numbers for a typical African country would be t = 1890, d = 75,
and f = 37. Indeed, figures 1 and 2 as well as our discussion above seem
to suggest that we can make a rough division between what we refer to as
a mercantilist wave, lasting perhaps until 1715 when Mauritius is colonized,
and an imperialist wave starting with the central colonization of India, and
reaching its peak in 1880-1900.
Does this heterogeneity along the time dimension necessarily matter for
all-encompassing theories about the causal linkages between exogenous fac-
tors, colonial institutions, and economic development? To be more pre-
cise, why could we not reasonably expect that the mapping of some exoge-
nous variable X onto institutional quality ZC during the mercantilist era
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X1525 =⇒ ZC1825 typically is essentially the same as X1890 =⇒ ZC1965? Below,
we briefly outline arguments for the view that the timing of colonization is
indeed essential.
The argument against viewing colonialism as one historical process might
be divided into the following broad areas: (1) Colonial incentives and choice
sets, and (2) the impact of the disease environment. If we start with the first
area, it appears fairly uncontroversial to claim that the incentive structure
of the early colonists was quite diﬀerent from that of the late colonists.
We believe that our reference to a ’mercantilist’ and an ’imperialist’ era
provides a succinct summary of the diﬀerences in incentives. The Spanish
and Portuguese colonization eﬀorts with their peak in the first half of the
sixteenth century were largely driven by the desire to capture precious metals
(in America) and to gain monopoly positions in the lucrative spice trade (in
Asia) (Landes, 1998; Lange et al, 2006). For both the Spanish and the
Portuguese, the conquests of America and parts of Asia were further seen as
a continuation of the preceding ’reconquista’ of Muslim Granada (Landes,
1998).
Colonialism in the nineteenth century also had trade opportunities and
potentially easy riches as incentives, but the overall motives were now much
more complex. The benefits of free trade were now generally acknowledged.7
It is presumably impossible to understand the wave of colonizing eﬀorts after
1880 without reference to power strategic and imperialist considerations and
a spirit of increasing nationalistic rivalry. Colonies were often formed only
to prevent other powers from colonizing. Some of the British activities in
Africa might also be explained by a humanistic agenda aimed at rooting out
slavery and a more or less honest Western hope of spreading ’civilization’
(Pakenham, 1991).
A possibly even greater diﬀerence between the two eras concerned the
colonists’ choice sets or restrictions of action. In 1492, Cortés and Pizarro
showed the way by ruthlessly establishing the Spanish as the new rulers
of the Aztec and Inca empires. Cornerstones of colonial economies during
the mercantilist era were institutions like the ’encomienda’ - a system of
forced labor for native Indians - and slavery, mainly using imported African
slaves on sugar plantations. Strong rules of private property or for the
7Lange et al (2006) argue that the British pursued a ’liberal’ or ’capitalist’ model of
colonialism with profit as the ultimate aim.
11
constraint of the executive were not really to be found anywhere in Europe
(North, 1990; AJR, 2004). Not until the later half of the seventeenth century
did institutional development take oﬀ in England and in the Netherlands,
although really strong capitalist institutions were probably not in place even
there until the nineteenth century (North, 1990; AJR, 2005). Hence, a choice
between ’extractive’ and ’productive’ institutions does not seem to have been
in place during the mercantilist era.
By 1880, however, the situation was very diﬀerent. The French and
American revolutions, and the independence of most American nations had
radically changed the political landscape in the Western world. The En-
lightenment had brought a new way of scientific thinking based on empirical
observation and a political philosophy where the equality of men was an
important notion.8 The British abolished slave trading for their nation-
als in 1807, a policy which greatly aﬀected colonial policy even among the
other colonizing nations. Furthermore, the Industrial Revolution fundamen-
tally changed Western societies and strong private property rights and con-
straints against the executive were more or less generally accepted in the
major colonial centers. A discriminatory colonial policy giving favorable in-
stitutions to those colonies where there was settlement potential for Western
colonists would certainly have been possible. Yet, by this time, the supply
of European settlers was drying up.
The second key factor for understanding the diﬀerence between the two
major colonial eras, the disease environment, will be treated at some length
in the following section.
4 Disease environment
A variable that has been used and discussed by several authors as a can-
didate for Xt is AJR’s (2001) measure of settler mortality during colonial
times. The variable provides a proxy for settler mortality by using data
on mortality among soldiers and bishops in Western colonies between 1604-
1848, extracted mainly from the work of Curtin (1989). It shows the annual
number of deaths in malaria and yellow fever per 1000 people and is available
8Feyrer and Sacerdote (2006) contrast the purposes of Magellan’s journeys in 1519 with
those of Cook in 1768 and 1779 and find that whereas the spread of Christianity was an
important motive for Magellan, Cook seemed to be more driven by scientific curiousity
and a respect for the native people he encountered.
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for about 75 countries.
AJR’s (2001) main hypothesis was that settler mortality served as a use-
ful proxy for the feasibility of creating ’settler colonies’. Where the disease
environment was favorable to Western colonists, they created durable set-
tlements and installed strong institutions of private property (for instance
in United States and Australia), whereas where settler mortality was high
they developed ’extractive’ institutions designed to create the greatest flow
of rents with the least possible physical presence of colonists. Their empir-
ical analysis shows that colonies with high settler mortality indeed appears
to have weaker property rights and constraints against the executive than
colonies with a favorable disease environment. Subsequent articles by the
authors have further confirmed this hypothesis, as well as contributions from
other research teams (Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al, 2004).
AJR’s (2001) hypothesis and results have been challenged by a few works.
Albouy (2006) argues that AJR’s construction of their settler mortality-
variable suﬀers from ’inconsistencies, comparability problems, and and ques-
tionable geographic assignments’ and that when a revised series is used
instead, the relationship between institutions and settler mortality is not
robust. AJR (2006) refute all these claims. A more fundamental critique
from Glaeser et al (2004) rests on the argument that settler mortality did
not have its major impact through institutions but through human capi-
tal accumulation. The key insight according to this point of view is that
colonists in regions with low mortality essentially brought themselves rather
than good institutions. Glaeser et al (2004) also criticize most of the insti-
tutional variables in the literature as reflecting policy outcomes rather than
long-run institutions.
The angle for discussing settler mortality used in this article is the one
already developed above: Can we really assume that mortality in tropical
diseases during the Spanish conquest of America by 1525 follows the same
underlying relationship with institutional quality as during the scramble for
Africa in 1890? Mercantilist colonial strategies were surely to some extent
influenced by settler mortality, but probably even more so by the devastating
mortality among the indigenous population in smallpox and other diseases
introduced by Westerners. In for instance Mexico, the size of the Indian
population is believed to have plummeted from about 20 million by the time
of Cortés’ arrival in 1520 to 1.5 million in 1620 (Diamond, 1997, p 210). In
13
the Caribbean, the Indian populations often disappeared completely. In
their place, Spanish and British colonizers started to import African slaves.
The devastating long-run impact of this demographic revolution in parts
of America has been documented in the important work of Sokoloﬀ and
Engerman (2000).
Apart from this important fact, there is another fundamental diﬀerence
between 1525 and 1890: The revolution in tropical medicine that took place
in the mid 1800s. One of the main arguments delivered in Philip Curtin’s
works (1989, 1998) is indeed that the dramatic reduction in settler mortality
after 1840 appears to have made the colonization of Africa possible. In for
instance Algeria, the annual mortality among French troops fell from 81
per thousand soldiers in 1836-46 to 22 deaths per thousand in 1859-67,
implying a decrease in mortality of 73 percent during just two decades. The
rapid decline in mortality continued ever after 1860. In French West Africa,
annual mortality fell from 164 per thousand soldiers in 1819-38 to below 7
deaths per thousand in 1909-13, i.e. a reduction by 93%. Data for British
West Africa and South Africa show similar developments (Curtin, 1989,
Tables 1.1 and 1.8). AJR’s (2001) practice of using the earliest mortality
data available for Africa, often from the 1840s, seems problematic from
this perspective. The much higher rates of settler mortality from the first
half of the nineneenth century are not obviously relevant determinants of
colonial institutional policy in 1890. We might therefore have a problem of
measurement error.
What hypothesis emerges from these facts regarding the statistical rela-
tionship between settler mortality and institutions? The general empirical
specification in AJR:s first-stage estimation (2001) is:
ZPi,τ = α0 + α1LogMorti,ti + α2Controli + εi
where LogMort is the natural logarithm of the annual mortality series cre-
ated by AJR (2001) and Controli is a vector of control variables. AJR (2001)
run reduced form regressions with a measure of ZP , Risk of expropriation,
as the dependent variable (this variable is discussed further below).
What should we expect to find regarding the level of the LogMort-
estimate α1 if we divide the total sample into subsamples of countries colo-
nized before and after the revolution in tropical medicine around 1850? On
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the one hand, the general improvement in medicine after 1850 might im-
ply that mortality declined proportionally in the tropics and in mid-latitude
countries. In this case, the relative ’cost of relocation’ to the tropics in terms
of an increased probability of dying, which Curtin (1989) refers to, might
be roughly constant. Hence, one might expect α1 < 0 and that the absolute
magnitudes should be almost the same in both subsamples. On the other
hand, the potential problems of measurement error in LogMort related to
the revolution in tropical medicine, as well as the much smaller supply of po-
tential Western settlers during this era, would both suggest that α1 should
be weaker and perhaps not significantly diﬀerent from zero after 1850 and
during the African scramble. Our main hypothesis is that this latter eﬀect
dominates so that α1 is expected to be smaller in absolute terms among
African countries and countries colonized after 1850.
In order to test for parameter heterogeneity on the grounds discussed
above, we propose an empirical strategy where the main estimated equation
takes the following form:9
ZPi,τ = α0 + α1LogMorti,ti + α2Africai + α3Post1850i + α4Latitudei +(1)
+α5γLogMorti,ti ·Africai + α6 (1− γ)LogMorti,ti · Post1850i + i
Africa is a dummy variable equal to one for African countries and Post1850
indicates whether the country was colonized after 1850 (=1) or not (=0).
We include an Africa-dummy alongside our Post1850-dummy since even
African countries that were colonized before the nineteenth century, like
Ghana and South Africa, were still greatly aﬀected by the resurgence of
Western colonial ambitions in Africa after 1885. Our interest in 1850 is of
course due to the dramatic change in the eﬃciency of tropical medicine that
occurred around this time. Latitude measures absolute distance from the
equator in latitude degrees and is a control variable that is often included
in this type of studies. The standard result is that countries further from
the equator have stronger institutions, i.e. we would expect that α4 > 0. i
is a normally distributed error term. Note further that LogMorti,ti has a
(i, ti)-subscript, indicating that the date of the LogMort measurement varies
drastically over observations in the sample.
9Please see the Appendix for summary statistics and presentations of all variables
included.
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Our main regressors of interest are the interaction terms LogMorti,ti ·
Africai and LogMorti,ti · Post1850i. These are multiplied by a dummy
variable γ that indicates what partitition of the sample that we focus upon.
γ = 1 means that we compare the eﬀect of LogMort between African and
non-African countries and do not include the LogMorti,ti ·Post1850i-term,
whereas γ = 0 means that we leave out LogMorti,ti · Africai and focus
on diﬀerences between countries colonized before and after 1850. The null
hypothesis that we test is α5 = α6 = 0. If the estimates of α5 and α6 are
positive and significantly diﬀerent from zero, we have confirmed our main
hypothesis of a less pronounced relationship in these categories of colonies.
Table 2 shows the results of this statistical exercise with AJR’s (2001)
Risk of expropriation as the dependent variable, believed to capture the
strength of property rights and the constraints against the executive. It
measures the average risk of expropriation during the years 1985-95 and
ranges between minimum 3.5 and maximum 10 with higher scores indicat-
ing a lower risk (i.e. better institutions). The variable is available for 64
countries that make up the base sample, specified in AJR, 2001, Appendix
Table A2.
In column 1, we start by exactly replicating the estimate in AJR (2001)
of -0.613, showing a strong negative influence of LogMort on institutional
quality as hypothesized. LogMort alone explains about 27 percent of the
variation, which is quite remarkable. A one standard deviation increase in
LogMort (1.25) results in a fall in Risk of expropriation of −0.613 · 1.25 =
−0.766, which is equivalent to 11.7 percent of the whole range of variation
in institutional quality.
In columns 2-3, we then run a first test for parameter heterogeneity with
dummies and interaction terms. In column 2, the coeﬃcient for LogMort in
the upper row falls drastically when we control for a diﬀerent relationship
among the African countries. The interaction term is strongly significant
and the implied coeﬃcient for the African countries is -0.12 to be compared
with -1.211 for the non-African countries. A one standard deviation increase
in LogMort thus causes an decrease in institutional quality by 1.51 units
(23.2 percent of total variation in Risk of expropriation) among non-African
countries, whereas the same change among the African countries causes a
decline by merely 0.15 units (2.3 percent). The coeﬃcient for LogMort in
Africa can further be shown to be insignificant. Column 3 also suggests that
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the coeﬃcients for countries colonized before and after 1850 are diﬀerent,
but since the interaction term is insignificant we can not reject the null
hypothesis of identical parameters.
The full test from the equation above is then carried out in columns 4 and
5. The estimates of α2 and α3 in column 4 are both negative and significant,
suggesting that colonies in the late imperialist wave of colonization are worse
oﬀ than earlier colonies. The significant estimate of α5 is however the most
interesting result. Column 4 once again implies that non-African colonies
have a very diﬀerent slope coeﬃcient for LogMort (α1 = −1.119) from that
of the African countries (α1 − α5 = −0.08). When we make the Post1850
partition in column 5, the slope for these colonies is again flatter but the
null hypothesis of α6 = 0 can not be rejected.
Risk of expropriation is however not the only measure that has been used
in the literature to capture the strength of property rights institutions and
the general quality of economic institutions. In table 3, columns 1-3, we use
instead the index Government Anti-Diversion Policies (GADP), originally
developed by Knack and Keefer (1995), as our institutions-variable. GADP
provides an average for the time period 1985-95 of five indicators; quality of
bureaucracy, rule of law, government corruption, risk of government repu-
diation of contracts, and lastly risk of expropriation, the indicator used by
AJR (2001). GADP thus provides a broader measure of institutional quality.
Column 1 first shows that whereas the relationship between institutions and
LogMort is negative and significant in the full sample, it is weakly significant
or non-significant in the African and Post1850 subsamples. In column 2, the
Africa and Post1850 dummies are both negative and significant. Further-
more, the interaction term in column 2 is positive and significant. Thus the
slope coeﬃcient for LogMort is a lot flatter in Africa than in the rest of the
world (α1 − α5 = −0.020 as compared to α1 = −0.136). Similarly, the slope
coeﬃcient for Post1850-countries is now significantly diﬀerent (i.e. flatter)
from that of earlier colonies.
The same basic pattern is prevalent in columns 4-9. In 4-6, the dependent
variable is Hall and Jones’ (1999) Social infrastructure, created by taking the
average of GADP and Sachs and Warner’s (1995) index of trade openness
during 1950-1994. LogMort is again shown to have a statistically significant
diﬀerence in slope coeﬃcients when we partition the sample along the Africa
and the Post1850-dimensions. In 7-9, we use Rule of law in 2002 from
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Kaufmann et al (2003), a variable also employed by Rodrik et al (2004) and
Easterly and Levine (2003).10 Again, the interaction terms are positive and
significant and the diﬀerences in slope estimates are large.
The implication of these results is that there are strong indications of
parameter heterogeneity in the settler mortality variable in the expected
direction. LogMort is still a remarkably robust determinant of institutional
quality among non-African colonies and colonies created before 1850, but
the relationship looks quite diﬀerent among countries associated with the
imperialist wave of colonization. In the next section, we will take a closer
look at how the timing and duration of colonization has aﬀected institutions.
5 Colonial determinants of institutional quality
5.1 Empirical strategy
In this section, we broaden the analysis to investigate how the duration
of colonial rule has aﬀected political and economic institutions. We also
study whether the impact of being a colony during the mercantilist era is
similar to the eﬀect of being a colony during the imperialist era. We focus
on two types of institutions that are generally believed to be central for
economic development; the level of democracy and the strength of the rule
of law. We also introduce a number of other potential determinants related
to colonialism such as country size, national identity of colonizer, and the
history of statehood.11
The main equation that we estimate has the simple setup:
ZPi,τ = β0 + β1Durationi + β2Controli + εi
ZPi,τ now includes measures of democracy and rule of law where a higher
score means ’better’ institutions. Duration is the total number of years
under colonial rule, i.e. Independence - Colonized where Independence is
the year of indepence and Colonized is the year of colonization, as discussed
in section two. Control is a vector of other colonialism-related variables.
This vector will often include the squared term Duration sq as a regressor
in order to check for non-linearities.
10We have normalized the variable to range between 0 and 100 to simplify the analysis.
11See the Data Appendix for an extensive description of the data used.
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At this stage, a brief note on causality is necessary. Could it be the
case that ZPi,τ in some way has had a reverse casual eﬀect on the duration
of colonialism? Using current income levels instead of institutional quality
as their dependent variable, Feyrer and Sacerdote (2006) consider such a
reverse causation mechanism and instrument colonial duration with wind
patterns. They find, however, that OLS and IV estimates are more or
less identical. We believe that a feedback loop from current institutions
to colonial duration is rather unlikely and it is unclear what direction such
an eﬀect would take.12 In the section below, we will nonetheless briefly check
the robustness of our hypotheses by employing an IV-approach.
We are primarily interested in three things: Whether we can reject the
null hypothesis of β1 = 0, i.e. if colonial duration has had a visible eﬀect
on the institutional quality of today. Secondly, we are interested in whether
the eﬀect of colonial duration is homogeneous over the diﬀerent eras of col-
onization and across continents. Thirdly, we want to analyze if there are
other colonial determinants of institutional quality with strong and signifi-
cant eﬀects.
5.2 Democracy
Democracy is the first variable that we take a closer look at. We include the
level of democracy since it is generally acknowledged that there is a clear link
between political freedom and economic development (Lipset, 1959; Barro,
1999). How causality runs is, however, still debated in the literature (Ace-
moglu et al, 2006). It is often proposed that political competition forces
otherwise self-interested governments to provide their population with pub-
lic goods like education and an eﬃcient rule of law. Failure to do so will
cause governments to be ousted by the electorate. Democracy is thus a
kind of over-arching institution that supplies rulers with incentives towards
eﬃcient and welfare-improving governance, as well as constraints against
opportunistic predation.
Our proxy for democracy is taken from the well-known Polity IV-dataset
collected by Marshall and Jaggers (2003). More specifically, we use their
’Polity’-variable for the year 2002 which combines the scores on their mea-
12We cannot say if it is more likely that colonial powers would tend to grant indepen-
dence early to colonies with strong institutions or if they would be inclined to keep such
colonies within their empires.
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sures of democracy and autocracy. A strong democracy is defined to have
a system of rule where citizens can eﬀectively express preferences for poli-
cies and leaders, where there are strong constraints against the executive,
and where civil liberites and political participation are well protected. An
autocracy then is characterized by a suppression of competitive political par-
ticipation, weak constraints on the government, and that leaders are chosen
within a small elite. In order to simplify the quantitive analysis, we have
normalized the variable to get a range from 0 to 100 where a score of 100
thus is given to the most democratic countries in 2002 whereas a score of
0 implies a completely autocratic country. In the first category, we find for
instance Australia, Mauritius, and Trinidad, whereas the least democratic
country in the world in 2002 is deemed to be Qatar. Countries that score
around 50 are very weak states that are neither democratic nor autocratic.
This group includes collapsed or almost collapsed states like DR Congo,
Somalia, and Liberia.13
It has been argued in this literature that levels of democracy are strongly
associated with income levels (Lipset, 1959; Barro, 1999). However, when
Acemoglu et al (2006) include country fixed eﬀects in a cross-country panel,
the link between changes in income levels and changes in democracy dis-
appears. They argue that what appears to matter the most are long-run
historical factors, for instance the date of independence from colonial rule.
We follow up on this track by specifically analyzing the long-run colonial
determinants of democracy.
In the empirical analysis, we use Polity as our dependent variable and
introduce a number of variables that are more or less associated with colo-
nialism. Our main variable Durationi measures the length of colonial rule
from colonization to independence. Cape Verde has the longest colonial
duration (513 years), followed by Aruba (503 years) and Puerto Rico (494
years). The shortest colonial eras were experienced in Liberia (23 years),
Bhutan (37 years), and Niger (38 years). The average duration of colonial
rule among the 143 colonies is 204 years with a standard deviation of 138
years.
Table 4 shows the first set of regressions. In column 1, we see that total
13We have chosen to redefine the ’interregnum’ or ’anarchy’ scores of -77 for Somalia
and DR Congo in the original dataset to a Polity-coding of 0, which gives them a score of
55 in our normalized Democracy-variable.
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duration of colonial rule is positively associated with the level of democ-
racy. The estimate is strongly significant and it is noteworthy that Duration
alone explains 26 percent of the variation in Polity. The point estimate
implies that a one standard deviation increase in Duration would increase
Polity by roughly 18 units, which is of course 18 percent of the whole range
(0.130*138.22).
However, as can be inferred from figure 3, showing the simple scatter
plot of Polity versus Duration, the relationship does not really appear to
be linear. When we introduce the squared term Duration sq in column 2,
we find that a non-linear specification improves the fit considerably so that
more than one third of the variation in the dependent variable is explained
by running just these two terms. The coeﬃcients imply that a maximum
is reached at roughly 315 years (0.4280/2 · 0.00068). In the sample of 96
countries with available Polity-data, only 15 have a value greater than 315
and are thus in the downward-sloping segment of the relationship. Figure
3 further indicates that there are three outliers with long colonial durations
that potentially aﬀect the estimates disproportionally: Cuba (CUB), Angola
(AGO), and Malaysia (MYS). Excluding these observations in column 3
makes R2 rise to almost 41 percent and causes the implied maximum to
increase to 365 years. In this case, only 5 of the colonies included are in the
downward-sloping region, which in turn means that for about 95 percent of
the countries, a marginal increase in colonial duration improves their level
of democracy.
In columns 4-6, we explore whether there is a temporal heterogeneity re-
garding the impact of colonial duration on democracy. In column 4, we only
use colonies created during the mercantilist era, i.e. before 1750. As sug-
gested by figure 3, the relationship between Duration and Polity is negative
and insignificant for these 36 countries, whereas it is positive but insignifi-
cant for the remaining 60 countries. In column 6, we see that the positive
general relationship for the whole sample is largely driven by countries col-
onized after 1850, during the heyday of imperialist colonialism. The large
estimate for Duration at 0.54 is strongly significant and implies that every
decade of colonial rule during this period increases levels of democracy by
5.4 units. This is indeed consistent with the hypotheses developed earlier
about the diﬀerent nature of the colonial eras.
The constants in columns 4-6 reveals that there is an additional dimen-
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sion to this story. The constant in column 4 is 102.35 whereas it falls to 5.27
in column 6. Combining the level of the constants and the point estimates
in columns 4 and 6 reveals that average levels of democracy are much higher
among countries colonized during the mercantilist era. In fact, the predicted
level of democracy in a mercantilist colony with a Duration = 500 is 73.3
whereas the predicted value for an imperialist colony with a Duration = 100
is only 59.3. We will discuss this aspect further below. Columns 7 and 8 show
that the diﬀerences are not driven by any heterogeneity between Africa and
the rest of the world since β0 and β1 do not display such a large diﬀerence
in magnitudes as in the time-related subsamples.
In table 5, we then introduce a number of other potential colonial deter-
minants of democracy besides duration. In column 1, we include a variable
State History, capturing the extent of countries’ statehood experience since
the year 1 A.D. (Putterman, 2004). A high value (close to unity) means that
the country has a long history of statehood above tribal level with indigenous
rulers in power. Former colonies with the highest score are Ethiopia (0.98),
Sri Lanka (0.85), and Cambodia (0.84), whereas the lowest scorers are Papua
New Guinea (0.01), Kenya (0.01), and Central African Republic (0.01). The
negative and significant estimate of State History in column 1 implies that
when controlling for the duration of colonization, former colonies with a
long history of advanced government are more likely to be led by autocratic
regimes today.14 Thus, there appears to be a kind of ’democratic curse’
among ancient states.15
In column 2, we try a battery of geographical determinants; the logged
size of country territory (Log Area), an island dummy (Island), settler mor-
tality (Log Mort), the absolute distance from the equator in latitude degrees
(Latitude), and a dummy for landlockedness (Landlocked). Out of these,
only the Island dummy is significant at the 1 percent level, as previously
found by Congdon Fors (2006) and others. All else equal, islands have a
14The unconditional relationship between Polity and State History is however weak.
We also acknowledge the possibility of a kind of reverse causality in the sense that the
type of government might influence a country’s success at maintaining a sovereign state.
Throughout most of history, a country with persistent democratic rule would run a very
high risk of being conquered by aggressive military rulers in neighboring countries and
possibly even cease to be a state.
15The ’reversal of fortune’-hypothesis by AJR (2002) maintains that colonies that were
relatively rich by the year 1500 A.D. would be more heavily plundered and be relatively
poor today. See also Chanda and Putterman (2006) for further tests of this hypothesis.
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Polity-score that is about 30 percent higher than for non-islands. Some-
what surprisingly, it also turns out that geographically large countries tend
to be more democratic, a result that is well in line (and largely driven by)
the strong democratic traditions in large countries like Australia, Canada,
and the United States. Even more suprising is the fact that the Landlocked -
dummy is positive and weakly significant.16 It is further noteworthy that Log
Mort does not explain levels of democracy and neither does Latitude, two
geographical variables that are commonly featured in this type of studies.
Regional dummies are included in column 3. Neo-Europe captures the
impact of the four outliers Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
States that all have exceptional institutional quality. The estimate for Neo-
Europe is very high and significant as usual in this type of regressions.17
Asian countries, on the other hand, are typically significantly less democ-
ractic, as the estimate for the Asia dummy shows. When we check for the
national identity of the last colonizer in column 4, none of the dummies for
British, French, and Spanish colonies are significant, which we find some-
what surprising given the large literature on this topic.
In columns 5 and 6, finally, we make two more checks about the ro-
bustness of the association between Duration and Polity. In column 5, we
use the quantile regression estimator QREG that minimizes absolute least
squares and thus gives smaller weight to extreme observations. The levels of
the parameter estimates both change compared to the estimates in table 4,
column 2, but the signs are unaltered as are the strong levels of significance.
In column 6, we take seriously the potential concern mentioned above
of reverse causality between Polity and Duration. As an instrument for
Duration, we use Colonized, the date of colonization. Though the extent
of democratic governance during colonial times could possibly have aﬀected
the duration of colonial rule, for instance in countries like United States
and India, we believe it is highly unlikely that there could be any logical
causal relationship from levels of democracy in 2002 to the date of the first
colonization, often happening several hundreds of year ago. Colonized turns
16Landlocked is not significant if we exclude LogMort and run a regression with 96
countries. Log Area is in turn insignificant when we include a dummy for the four ’Neo-
European’ countries, as discussed below.
17 It is well known in the empirical literature on colonialism that the Neo-European
countries tend to be extreme outliers (AJR, 2001; Bertocchi and Canova, 2002; Hansson
and Olsson, 2006).
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out to be a very strong predictor of Duration in the first stage (the earlier
the colonization, the more durable was the colonial era). In the second
stage, the instrumented level of Duration has again a strong positive overall
impact on Polity with an estimate that is fairly close to the non-instrumented
coeﬃcient in table 4, column 1.
5.3 Rule of law
The second type of institutions that we analyze here is Rule of law. As
mentioned above, the variable is intended to reflect the strength of property
rights and the general rule of law and order, both of which are features that
are generally deemed to be central for economic development (North, 1990;
AJR, 2001, 2002; Rodrik et al, 2004). We use a measure for the year 2002
from Kaufmann et al (2003) that we have normalized to range between 0
and 100. In accounting for the variation in Rule of law in table 6, we have
used the same basic setup of independent colonial variables as previously.
When Duration enters the specification as a linear term in column 1,
the estimate is positive and significant at the 0.05-level. As the scatter
plot in figure 4 indicates, the unconditional relationship is not very strong
and not obviously either concave or convex, as the non-significant estimates
in column 2 confirm. In the other columns of the table, the estimates for
Duration display a lot of variation and are not always significant. The
marginal impact of Duration on Rule of law is further relatively small. The
timing aspects of colonization thus do not appear to be strongly relevant
for Rule of law. An interesting result is further that State History is now
insignificant in column 3.
When we try the set of geographical variables in column 4, R2 rises to
almost 65 percent though with only 74 observations. The reason for this fall
in observations in column 4 is of course the inclusion of Log Mort, which
as we have already seen is a strong determinant of Rule of law. However,
also Log Area and Latitude have strong correlations with Rule of law. The
estimate for Log Area implies that the relationship between Rule of law and
size of country territory is negative and convex. As discussed at length in
Herbst (2000) and Hansson and Olsson (2006), country area can be regarded
as a colonial variable since borders were set by the colonists and were then
rarely changed after independence. It is further likely that the reason for
the negative relationship has to do with the diﬃculties of broadcasting in-
24
stitutions over space and that larger countries tend to be endowed with a
greater absolute amount of natural resource riches, which in turn increases
rent seeking and irresponsible government. Log Area has a negative coeﬃ-
cient throughout the specifications, even when we expand the sample to 128
observations as in columns 5 and 6.
The strength of Rule of law further increases with distance from the
equator, and as before, island status is good for institutional quality. Re-
markably, none of the regional dummies in column 5 are significantly dif-
ferent from zero when controlling for geography and the duration of colo-
nialism. It is further noteworthy that among the dummies for the colonizer
nationality-dummies, only Britain is weakly significant with a positive sign,
suggesting that a British colonial origin implies a 7-8 percent stronger Rule
of law, holding all other variables constant. Controlling for Duration, Span-
ish former colonies do not seem to have a weaker Rule of law.
In the last two columns, we include Polity and its squared value in the
regression. The motivation for this is that democracy is sometimes seen
as a kind of ’meta-institution’, or basic rule of the game, that could sup-
port the creation of economic institutions like property rights and executive
constraints (Rodrik, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). We include a
squared term because there is reason to believe that the strength of prop-
erty rights and the general maintenance of law and order can sometimes be
eﬃciently carried out by autocratic regimes (with a low Polity-score) as well
as by democratic regimes (with a high Polity-score). The countries with the
worst prerequisites for upholding the rule of law are presumably weak states
that are neither democratic nor autocratic (with a Polity-score around 50).
Indeed, figure 5 and the estimates in columns 7 and 8 clearly indicate
that we have a u-shaped association between Rule of law and the level of
democracy as measured by Polity. A strong autocracy is thus good for law
and order, as can be exemplified by the appearance of the small Gulf states in
the upper-left corner of Figure 4.18 This relationship survives the inclusion
of control variables in columns 7 and 8. The parameter values in column
7 imply that a minimum is reached at a Polity-level of approximately 51.
We should, however, be cautious in interpreting this as a causal relationship
18Singapore is the obvious outlier and the fit of a nonlinear specification increases a lot
if the country is excluded. The non-linear relationship is also robust to excluding the four
Gulf states Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait in the upper-left corner
of Figure 5, although t-values fall.
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since it is quite likely that the strength of rule of law also could aﬀect the
level of democracy (Rigobon and Rodrik, 2005). Note also that Duration is
not significant in this specification, which might suggest that the main eﬀect
of Duration runs through Polity.
6 Interpretation
The broad argument in this article is that the timing and duration of colo-
nization is central for understanding institutional outcomes. We have argued
that it is highly problematic to treat Western colonialism as one historical
experiment. For instance, we have seen that the disease environment had
very diﬀerent eﬀects on institutions in countries colonized after the revo-
lution in tropical medicine and that the institutional legacy of the African
scramble appears to be diﬀerent from that of the mercantilist era. In the
previous section, we therefore tried to systematically control for the tem-
poral aspect of colonization. How should the results from this exercise be
interpreted?
We argue that there are three main results. Firstly, that the duration of
colonial rule appears to have a predominantly positive eﬀect on institutional
quality. This striking result is somewhat similar in spirit to the results of
Grier (1999) and Feyrer and Sacerdote (2006) who respectively showed that
the duration of colonialism had a positive eﬀect on present growth rates and
income levels. It naturally also stands in contrast to dependency theory
that generally claims an overall negative social eﬀect of colonialism. The
impact of colonial duration is most pronounced on levels of democracy, but
the eﬀects of mercantilist and imperialist colonialism are markedly diﬀerent.
Colonial duration is positively associated with levels of democracy among
countries colonized after 1850 whereas the relationship is negative and non-
significant among early colonies. Combining these relationships with the fact
that early colonies tend to have relatively high levels of democracy today,
results in the concave association in figure 3.
A potential intepretation of this relationship is that Western penetration
after 1850 during an enlightened (yet imperialist) age created an openness
to Western ideas and ideals that facilitated the transition to democracy and
modernization. The case of India is illustrative in this sense. Being colonized
in 1750 and with a peak of British dominance in the late 1800s, it is the
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country with the longest duration of imperialist colonial rule and also one
of the most democratic countries today (see top right scatter plot in Figure
3). In the other end of the Polity-range, we find many African countries and
the Gulf states. In the Gulf states case, it seems likely that the colonial
experience was not long enough to break down already established patterns
of autocratic rule. In the African case, it rather seems as if Western influence
was not durable enough to create functioning states with generally accepted
boundaries and eﬃcient forms of government. Hence, African countries are
predominantly found among the autocratic and very weak states.
Secondly, the fact that State History has a strong negative impact on
levels of democracy when controlling for colonial duration suggests that
there is a kind of ’curse of ancient states’. We believe that the logic is
the following: Up until the nineteenth or twentieth centuries, statehood
experience throughout the world was more or less equivalent to an experience
of autocratic rule. This explains why South Asian countries like Myanmar,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka with long histories of statehood and autocratic rule
are highly autocratic still today. Colonial experience was probably not long
enough to break down these traditions. Countries without ancient histories,
like the United States and Kenya, could instead form their constitutions
according to the best-practice of the day without this type of constraining
historical heritage.19 One might indeed speculate that this theory holds
even for ancient non-former colonies like China and most of the countries in
the Middle East, all of which are strongly autocratic.
Lastly, the results in tables 5 and 6 show that the identity of the colo-
nizer does not seem to have a sizeable eﬀect when controlling for duration.
This might be said to stand in some contrast to a large tradition in the lit-
erature emphasizing the very diﬀerent ideologies of particularly Spain and
Britain that were supposedly reflected in their colonial policies and institu-
tions (North, 1990; Lange et al, 2006). Admittedly, Neo-Europe is a kind of
dummy for an disproportionally large British colonial penetration so among
those four countries, one might certainly argue that British influence has
been positive for our institutional variables. But a Spanish dummy does not
give any strong results for either Polity or Rule of law. The hypothesis that
19This notion of the damaging eﬀect of a long history is similar in spirit to Mancur
Olson’s (1982) famous proposition that countries with ’institutional sclerosis’ had lower
growth after Word War II.
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diﬀerent national colonial ideologies should be important for institutional
outcomes therefore does not appear to receive strong support. Rather, our
results seem to support the basic theme developed in this article, namely
that it was primarily the timing of colonization that mattered for levels of
democracy, whereas geographical fundamentals like country size and dis-
tance from the equator determined the strength of rule of law.
7 Conclusions
In this article, we create a new dataset of 143 colonies that are currently
treated as countries by the World Bank. On the basis of this data and
existing works, we suggest a temporal approach to studying the institutional
impact of colonialism. In particular, we argue that the several hundred years
of Western colonialism should be divided into a mercantilist phase (defined
by the new colony formation in the 1520s in America) and an imperialist
phase (with the African scramble after 1885 as the central process) that
are too diﬀerent to be treated as one coherent historical experiment. For
instance, we show that the often used measure of settler mortality had a
very diﬀerent impact on countries colonized after the revolution in tropical
medicine around 1850.
In a broader analysis of the colonial determinants of democracy and rule
of law, it is shown that whereas there appears to be a general positive re-
lationship between colonial duration and institutional quality, the positive
eﬀect is most pronounced on levels of democracy for countries colonized af-
ter 1850 during a more enlightened imperialist era. When controlling for
colonial duration, we show that older states are significantly less democratic
than younger states. Democracy further appears to have a u-shaped asso-
ciation with rule of law, although the issue of causality remains open. The
national identity of the colonizer has only a minor impact once we control for
the timing of the colonial experience. Our interpretation is that it was not
so much diﬀerent national ideologies that caused British colonies to have
stronger institutions than other colonies, but rather the fact that British
colonialism took place during a generally more enlightened era in history.
Our broad conclusion is that comparative studies based on the temporal
heterogeneity in the colonial experiment appears to be a fruitful area for
future research.
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Table 1: Previously used colonial samples. 
 
Study Observations Regions 
AJR (2001) 64 countries All continents 
Acemoglu et al (2006) 87 countries All continents 
Banerjee and Iyer (2005) 166 districts Indian districts 
Bertocchi and Canova  38 countries Africa 
Feyrer and Sacerdote (2006) 80 island countries 
and islands  
Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans 
Grier (1999) 63 countries All continents 
Lange (2004) 33 countries  British colonies 
Lange et al (2006) 57 countries British and Spanish colonies 
Price (2003 72 countries  Countries with a twentieth century colonial 
experience 
Rodrik et al (2004) 103 (79) countries All continents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: OLS tests for parameter heterogeneity in Log Mort   
  
 Dependent variable: 
Risk of expropriation (AJR, 2001)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Log Mort 
 
 
-0.613*** 
(0.152) 
 
-1.211*** 
(0.201) 
 
-0.571** 
(0.235) 
 
-1.119*** 
(0.215) 
 
-0.533** 
(0.262) 
 
Africa (dummy)   -5.311*** 
(1.286) 
 -4.461*** 
(1.081) 
0.369 
(0.472) 
 
Post 1850 (dummy)  
 
 -1.740 
(1.310) 
-0.994*** 
(0.380) 
 
-1.974 
(1.358) 
Log Mort * Africa 
 
 1.091*** 
(0.279) 
 1.039*** 
(0.253) 
 
Log Mort * Post 1850   0.188 
(0.280) 
 0.191 
(0.277) 
Latitude 
 
   0.016 
(0.012) 
 
0.022 
(0.014) 
 
Implied LogMort 
estimate: Africa a 
 
 -0.120  -0.080  
Implied LogMort 
estimate: Post1850 a 
 
  -0.383  -0.342 
N  64 64 64 64 64 
R2 0.274 0.413 0.336 0.482 0.369 
 
Note: Estimated intercepts are omitted from the table. The superscript *** denotes a p-value smaller than 0.01, ** 
denotes a p-value smaller than 0.05, and * denotes a p-value smaller than 0.1. In parenthesis are robust standard 
errors.  
a The implied Log Mort estimates for Africa and Post1850 in columns (2)-(5) have simply been calculated on the 
basis of the specifications in these columns (i.e. α1+ α5 in columns (2) and (4), α1+ α6 in columns (3) and (5)).
 
Table 3: OLS tests for parameter heterogeneity using three related institutional variables    
  
Dependent variables 
(in bold) 
GADP 
(Knack and Keefer, 1995) 
Social infrastructure 
(Hall and Jones, 1999) 
Rule of law 
(Kaufmann et al, 2003) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Log Mort 
 
 
-0.064*** 
(0.016) 
 
-0.136*** 
(0.028) 
 
 
-0.083*** 
(0.024) 
 
-0.103*** 
(0.021) 
 
-0.191*** 
(0.041) 
 
-0.123*** 
(0.039) 
 
-10.80*** 
(2.11) 
 
-16.92*** 
(3.68) 
 
-12.71*** 
(3.31) 
Africa (dummy)  
 
 -0.421*** 
(0.127) 
 
0.098** 
(0.039) 
 -0.700*** 
(0.220) 
0.017 
(0.076) 
 -57.98*** 
(18.02) 
6.61 
(7.06) 
Post 1850 (dummy)  -0.126*** 
(0.034) 
 
-0.407*** 
(0.139) 
 -0.132** 
(0.054) 
-0.582** 
(0.225) 
 -8.97 
(6.56) 
-67.01*** 
(20.41) 
Latitude 
 
 0.003* 
(0.001) 
 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.51*** 
(0.18) 
0.514** 
(0.20) 
Log Mort * Africa 
 
 0.116*** 
(0.029) 
  0.160*** 
(0.045) 
  13.37*** 
(3.75) 
 
Log Mort * Post 1850   0.060** 
(0.027) 
 
  0.095** 
(0.040) 
  11.29*** 
(3.69) 
Log Mort estimate: 
Africab  
 
-0.033* 
(0.019) 
-0.020  -0.037 
(0.028) 
-0.031  -5.14** 
(2.07) 
-3.55  
Log Mort estimate: 
Post1850 b 
 
-0.022 
(0.016) 
 -0.023 -0.030 
(0.022) 
 -0.028 -2.03 
(2.46) 
 -1.42 
N  73 73 73 72 72 72 75 75 75 
R2 0.246 0.461 0.395 0.332 0.492 0.440 0.329 0.500 0.491 
 
Note: Estimated intercepts are omitted from the table. The superscript *** denotes a p-value smaller than 0.01, ** denotes a p-value smaller than 0.05, and * 
denotes a p-value smaller than 0.1. In parenthesis are robust standard errors.  
b The Log Mort estimates for Africa and Post1850 are constructed in the following way: In columns (1), (4), and (7), the estimates presented have been 
obtained by regressing the institutional variable on only Log Mort in the African and Post 1850-subsamples respectively. In columns (2), (5), and (8), we have 
simply calculated the implied coefficients for the African countries on the basis of the specifications in these columns (α1+ α5). In columns (3), (6), and (9), 
we have made equivalent calculations ((α1+ α6)). 
Table 4: Colonial duration and democracy 
 
    Dependent variable: 
Polity 
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Samples Full sample Full sample Excl. outliersc Colonized 
before 1750 
Colonized 
after 1750 
Colonized 
after 1850 
Africa Non-Africa 
Constant  38.95*** 
(5.07) 
17.92*** 
(7.11) 
20.07*** 
(6.97) 
102.35*** 
(18.53) 
33.80*** 
(9.02) 
5.27 
(15.16) 
42.92*** 
(5.30) 
34.71*** 
(11.46) 
Duration 0.130*** 
(0.023) 
0.428*** 
(0.075) 
0.385*** 
(0.071) 
-0.058 
(0.059) 
0.157 
(0.095) 
0.540*** 
(0.198) 
0.084** 
(0.032) 
0.155*** 
(0.042) 
Duration sq  -0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
     
         
N 96 96 93 36 60 46 48 48 
R2 0.263 0.343 0.408 0.058 0.103 0.144 0.105 0.300 
 
Note: The superscript *** denotes a p-value smaller than 0.01, ** denotes a p-value smaller than 0.05, and * denotes a p-value smaller than 0.1. In parenthesis 
are robust standard errors. The estimator is OLS. 
c The three excluded outliers are Angola, Cuba, and Malaysia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Colonial determinants of democracy 
 
  Dependent variable: 
Polity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS QREG IV 
Duration 0.401*** 
(0.067) 
0.461*** 
(0.079) 
0.364*** 
(0.095) 
0.435*** 
(0.102) 
0.518*** 
(0.101) 
0.155*** 
(0.023) 
Duration sq -0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
 
State History -32.47*** 
(10.10) 
     
Log Area  2.80** 
(1.36) 
    
Island (dummy)  29.70*** 
(8.01) 
    
Landlocked (dummy)  13.41* 
(6.70) 
    
Neo-Europe (dummy)   27.78*** 
(8.26) 
   
Asia (dummy)   -23.40*** 
(7.38) 
   
Other controls c No LogMort 
Latitude 
Africa  
C America & 
Carib 
Spain 
Britain 
France 
  
1st stage dependent 
variable 
     Duration 
Colonized       -0.731*** 
(0.028) 
N 82 69 96 96 96 96 
R2 0.391 0.521 0.454 0.348 0.286d 0.877e 
 
Note: Estimated intercepts are omitted from the table. The superscript *** denotes a p-value smaller than 0.01, ** denotes a p-value smaller than 0.05, and * 
denotes a p-value smaller than 0.1. In parenthesis are robust standard errors. The estimator is OLS in columns (1)-(4), a quantile regression procedure in 
column (5), and IV in column (6), using the date of colonization (Colonized) as the instrumental variable in the first stage. 
c Wherever additional control variables have been used, they all have insignificant estimates that are not reported.  
d Pseudo R2 . 
e R2 from the first-stage regression.  
 
Table 6: Colonial determinants of rule of law 
 
    Dependent variable: 
Rule of law 
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Duration 0.034** 
(0.014) 
0.082 
(0.059) 
0.040*** 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
0.021 
(0.014) 
0.030** 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.017) 
 
Duration sq  -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
      
Neo-Europe (dummy)   60.07*** 
(3.41) 
35.35*** 
(8.64) 
49.26*** 
(7.90) 
49.29*** 
(7.78) 
41.68*** 
(5.30) 
40.59*** 
(8.50) 
Log Mort     -4.33** 
(1.90) 
    
Log Area    -2.65*** 
(1.01) 
-4.28*** 
(0.56) 
-3.99*** 
(0.54) 
 -2.93** 
(1.17) 
Latitude    0.48** 
(0.196) 
0.70*** 
(0.163) 
0.66*** 
(0.17) 
 0.494*** 
(0.187) 
Island    15.83*** 
(5.80) 
    
Britain (dummy)      7.47* 
(4.10) 
  
Polity        -1.29*** 
(0.33) 
-0.795** 
(0.320) 
Polity sq       0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.0082*** 
(0.003) 
Other controls c No No State history Landlocked  Africa  
S America 
C America & 
Carib 
France  
Spain  
No No 
         
N 128 128 89 74 128 128 96 96 
R2 0.037 0.041 0.356 0.646 0.555 0.544 0.447 0.535 
 
Note: Estimated intercepts are omitted from the table. The superscript *** denotes a p-value smaller than 0.01, ** denotes a p-value smaller than 0.05, and * 
denotes a p-value smaller than 0.1. In parenthesis are robust standard errors. The estimator is OLS in all specifications.  
c Wherever additional control variables have been used, they all have insignificant estimates which are not reported.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Dates of colonization and independence for 143 colonies.  
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Figure 2: Time distribution of new colony formation, 1462-1922. 
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Note: The columns show the number of new colonies formed during a particular decade.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Scatter plot for level of democracy in 2002 and duration of colonial rule in 
96 colonies. 
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Note: See table 4, columns 1-2 for the linear and non-linear regression estimates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Scatter plot for the rule of law in 2002 and duration of colonial rule for 128 
colonies. 
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Note: See table 6, columns 1-2 for the linear and non-linear regression estimates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Scatter plot for the rule of law in 2002 and level of democracy for 96 
colonies.  
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Note: See table 6, columns 7-8 for the regression estimates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Data Appendix  
(Not for publication) 
 
Country Isocode Colonized Founding event Independence 
Algeria DZA 1830 French army conquers Algiers and sends ruler Husayn into exile. 1962 
American Samoa ASM 1899 The island is annexed by Germany and the United States. 2002 
Angola AGO 1576 Paulo Dias de Novais founds Luanda. 1975 
Anguilla AIA 1650 British settlers colonize the island from Saint Kitts. 2002 
Antigua ATG 1632 Antigua colonized by the British, Barbuda in 1678. 1981 
Argentina ARG 1536 Pedro de Mendoza founds Buenos Aires. 1816 
Aruba ABW 1499 The Spanish discover and claim the island. 2002 
Australia AUS 1788 Arthur Phillip leads first settlement of former convicts in New South Wales. 1901 
Bahamas BHS 1648 William Sayle settles the island.  1973 
Bahrain BHR 1861 The country becomes a British protectorate after a treaty. 1971 
Bangladesh BGD 1757 The British becomes the dominant power in Bengal. 1947 
Barbados BRB 1627 English colonists settle the island. 1966 
Belize BLZ 1524 Guatemala is incorporated into the Spanish colonial empire. 1991 
Benin BEN 1863 Kingdom of Porto Novo becomes a French protectorate. 1960 
Bermuda BMU 1612 The Virginia Company settles the islands. 2002 
Bhutan BHU 1910 The country becomes a British protectorate after a treaty. 1947 
Bolivia BOL 1559 Chuquisaca becomes the seat of government for Upper Peru.  1825 
Botswana BWA 1885 The country becomes a British protectorate.  1966 
Brazil BRA 1533 The Portuguese organize a colonial government. 1822 
Brunei BRN 1888 Brunei becomes a British protectorate. 1984 
British Virgin Islands VGB 1555 A Spanish invasion force claims the islands. 2002 
Burkina Faso BFA 1895 Yatenga becomes a French protectorate. 1960 
Burundi BDI 1899 Burundi and Rwanda are included in German East Africa. 1962 
Cambodia KHM 1863 The country becomes a French protectorate. 1964 
Cameroon CMR 1884 The country becomes a German protectorate. 1960 
Canada CAN 1608 Samuel de Champlain found a fur trading post at Quebec. 1867 
Cape Verde CPV 1462 The Portuguese found Cidade Velha and settle the island. 1975 
Cayman Islands CYM 1670 England is granted power over the islands. 2002 
 2 
 
Central African 
Republic 
CAF 
 
 
1899 
 
 
The French settle at Bangui. 
 
 
1960 
 
Chad TCD 1898 French troops occupy the area. 1960 
Chile CHL 1541 Pedro de Valdivia founds Santiago. 1818 
Colombia COL 1525 Rodrigo de Bastidas found Santa Marta. 1819 
Comoros COM 1843 France takes possession of Mayotte island. 1975 
Congo, Republic of COG 1880 De Brazza signs treaty that makes the area a French possession. 1960 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of 
ZAR 
 
1885 
 
King Leopold's Congo Free State is recognized at the Berlin Conference. 
 1960 
Cook Islands COK 1821 British missionaries from London Missionary Society settle the island. 1965 
Costa Rica 
 
CRI 
 
1502 
 
Columbus reaches the area during his fourth Atlantic voyage and settlement is 
initiated. 
1821 
 
Cuba CUB 1511 Diego Velázquez de Cuéllar founds Baraboa and settles the island. 1898 
Djibouti DJI 1862 A French colony is created. 1977 
Dominica DMA 1632 The French settle the island. 1978 
Dominican Republic DOM 1492 Columbus arrives on Hispaniola and settlement starts. 1821 
East Timor ETM 1642 Permanent settlement starts. 1975 
Ecuador ECU 1535 Second Inca capital Quito is conquered by the Spanish. 1822 
Egypt EGY 1882 British troops occupy the country. 1922 
El Salvador SLV 1524 Guatemala is incorporated into the Spanish colonial empire. 1821 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 1778 The Spanish take over the Fernando Po island from the Portuguese. 1968 
Eritrea ERI 1890 Italian colony is created. 1993 
Fiji FJI 1874 British crown colony. 1970 
French Guyana GUF 1643 French colonists found Cayenne. 2002 
French Polynesia PYF 1842 Tahiti becomes a French protectorate. 2002 
Gabon GAB 1841 Local kings accept French sovereignty. 1960 
Gambia GMB 1816 Alexander Grant purchase Banjul Island.  1965 
Ghana 
 
GHA 
 
1482 
 
The Portuguese build Elmina castle which leads to a major change in the 
trading patterns and power relations in the interior. 1957 
Grenada GRD 1650 Jaques Dyel du Parquet establish a settlement at St. George's. 1974 
Guadeloupe 
 
GLP 
 
1635 
 
Léonard de L'Olive and Jean Duplessis d'Ossonville establish a French 
colony. 2002 
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Guam GUM 1565 The Spanish claim the island. 2002 
Guatemala GTM 1523 Guatemala is incorporated into the Spanish colonial empire. 1821 
Guinea GIN 1881 Fouta Djallon place his country under French protection. 1958 
Guinea-Bissau GNB 1879 Portuguese colony. 1974 
Guyana GUY 1580 Dutch settlement begins. 1966 
Haiti HTI 1665 The French appoint a governor on Tortuga Island 1804 
Honduras HND 1524 Guatemala is incorporated into the Spanish colonial empire. 1821 
Hong Kong HKG 1842 Hong Kong Island is ceded to Britain by the Treaty of Nanking. 1997 
India 
 
IND 
 
1750 
 
Robert Clive defeats the nawab of Bengal and the East India Company 
becomes the dominant force in the country. 1947 
Indonesia IDN 1619 The Dutch East India Company found Batavia (Jakarta) on Java. 1945 
Ivory Coast CIV 1830 The French sign treaties and start building forts and trading posts. 1960 
Jamaica JAM 1509 Juan de Esquivel founds the town Sevilla la Nueva and the first settlement. 1962 
Kenya KEN 1895 East Africa Protectorate is formed. 1963 
Kiribati KIR 1892 Gilbert Islands become a British protectorate. 1979 
Kuwait KUW 1914 British protectorate. 1961 
Laos 
 
LAO 
 
1893 
 
Thailand gives up area to the east of Mekong River and Laos becomes a 
French protectorate. 1949 
Lesotho 
 
LSO 
 
1868 
 
King Monshoeshoe asks for British protection against the Boers and the 
country becomes a British protectorate. 1966 
Liberia LIB 1824 American Colonization Society founds Liberia and capital Monrovia. 1847 
Libya LBY 1912 The Ottomans cede the country to Italy after an Italian invasion. 1951 
Macao 
 
MAC 
 
1887 
 
The Portuguese establish a colony after having settled the peninsula since 
1557. 1999 
Madagascar 
 
MDG 
 
1895 
 
French troops occupy Antananarivo, sends the prime minister into exile, and 
establish a French Protectorate. 1960 
Malawi MWI 1891 The British establish the Nyasaland district protectorate. 1964 
Malaysia MYS 1511 Portuguese admiral Afonso de Albuquerque conquers Malacca. 1957 
Maldives MDV 1887 British protectorate proclaimed. 1965 
Mali 
 
MLI 
 
1893 
 
Colonel Louis Archinard conquers Segou and the French then control the 
Niger. 1960 
Marshall Islands MHL 1886 British protectorate. 1986 
Martinique MTQ 1635 Pierre Belain d'Esnambuc and French settlers occupy the island. 2002 
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Mauretania MRT 1903 The territory becomes a part of French West Africa. 1960 
Mauritius MUS 1715 French colony, referred to as Ile de France. 1968 
Mexico MEX 1521 Hernan Cortes conquers capital Tenochtitlan. 1824 
Micronesia FSM 1650 Approximate date of Spanish colonization. 1986 
Morocco MAR 1912 French protectorate by the Treat of Fez. 1956 
Mozambique MOZ 1505 The Portuguese conquer Sofala. 1975 
Myanmar 
 
MMR 
 
1886 
 
The country becomes a province of British India after the Third Anglo-
Burmese War. 1948 
Namibia NAM 1884 German protectorate. 1990 
Nauru NRU 1888 German protectorate. 1968 
Netherlands Antilles ANT 1527 The Spanish seize Curacao island. 2002 
New Caledonia NCL 1853 The French claim the islands. 2002 
New Zealand NZL 1840 British annexation after the Treaty of Waitangi. 1907 
Nicaragua NIC 1524 Francisco Hernandez de Cordoba starts permanent colonization. 1824 
Niger NER 1922 The French establish a regular colonial administration. 1960 
Nigeria NGA 1851 The British replace the local king in Lagos after a naval attack. 1960 
Niue NIU 1830 British missionaries from London Missionary Society settle the island. 1974 
Pakistan PAK 1750 See India. 1947 
Palau PCI 1886 The Spanish claim the islands. 1994 
Panama 
 
PAN 
 
1510 
 
The Spanish establish the first permanent settlements Nombre de Dios and 
San Sebastian de Uraba. 1821 
Papua New Guinea PNG 1884 Southeastern part of the island becomes a British protectorate. 1975 
Paraguay PRY 1537 The Spanish found Asuncion and settle the area. 1811 
Peru 
 
PER 
 
1531 
 
Francisco Pizarro and his Spanish forces execute Inca emperor Athuallpa and 
start conquering the territory. 1821 
Philippines PHL 1565 Miguel Lopez de Legazpi establishes first permanent Spanish settlement. 1898 
Puerto Rico PRI 1508 Juan Ponce de Leon founds Caparra. 2002 
Qatar QTR 1916 Treaty gives Britain the power to handle foreign policy. 1971 
Reunion REU 1650 The French settle the island in the mid-seventeenth century. 2002 
Rwanda RWA 1899 Burundi and Rwanda are included in German East Africa. 1963 
Samoa SAM 1899 The island is annexed by Germany and the United States. 1962 
Sao Tome and Principe STP 1522 The Portuguese establish a colony. 1975 
Senegal SEN 1638 The French establish a trading station at the mouth of the Senegal. 1960 
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Seychelles SYC 1756 The French annex the territory. 1976 
Sierra Leone SLE 1808 The British navy takes over a former slave settlement at Freetown. 1961 
Singapore 
 
SGG 
 
1819 
 
Thomas Stamford Raffles of the East India Company buys land and 
establishes a British trading post. 
1963 
 
Solomon Islands SLB 1885 The British and the Germans establish protectorates. 1978 
Somalia 
 
SOM 
 
1888 
 
The British and the French sign treaties that recognize the borders of their 
respective protectorates in the area. 1960 
South Africa ZAF 1652 The Dutch East India Company found found Cape Town trading post. 1910 
Sri Lanka 
 
LKA 
 
1619 
 
The Portuguese annex the kingdom of Jaffna and establish control of the 
territory. 1948 
Saint Kitts and Nevis KNA 1623 Thomas Warner establishes a British colony. 1983 
Saint Lucia LCA 1650 French settlers from Martinique establish control of the island. 1979 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
VCT 
 
1762 
 
British general Robert Monckton occupies the island. 
 1979 
Sudan 
 
SDN 
 
1898 
 
Horatio Herbert Kitchener defeats the Mahdist army in the Battle of 
Omdurman and establishes British rule over the area. 1956 
Suriname 
 
SUR 
 
1667 
 
The Dutch receive the area as compensation for losing New Amsterdam (New 
York) to the British. 1975 
Swaziland 
 
SWZ 
 
1903 
 
The British governor of Transvaal is empowered legislative powers by the 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act. 1968 
Tanzania TZA 1886 Anglo-German Agreement recognizes the territory as a German possession. 1961 
Togo TGO 1885 Gustav Nachtigal establishes a German protectorate. 1960 
Tonga TON 1900 British protectorate. 1970 
Trinidad and Tobago 
 
TTO 
 
1592 
 
Spaniard Antonio de Berrio takes possession of the island and founds St 
Joseph. 
1962 
 
Tunisia 
 
TUN 
 
1881 
 
The French invade the territory and assume power by the Treaty of Kasser 
Said.  1956 
Turks and Caicos Islands TCA 1678 Colonists from Bermuda settle the islands. 2002 
Tuvalu TUV 1892 British protectorate. 1978 
Uganda 
 
UGA 
 
1890 
 
Captain F.D. Lugard of the Imperial British East Africa Company signs a 
treaty with king Mwanga that puts the country under British protection.  1962 
United Arab Emirates UAE 1892 The British assume control of foreign policy. 1971 
United States USA 1607 British Virginia Company founds Jamestown colony. 1776 
Uruguay URY 1680 The Portuguese found town Colonia del Sacramento. 1825 
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Vanuatu VUT 1906 Anglo-French Condominium establishes joint rule of the territory.  1980 
Venezuela VEN 1523 Permanent Spanish settlement at Cumana. 1821 
Vietnam VNM 1859 French troops led by Rigault de Genouilly capture Saigon. 1945 
Virgin Islands VIR 1555 A Spanish invasion force claims the islands. 2002 
Yemen YMN 1839 Aden is captured by the British. 1967 
Zambia 
 
ZMB 
 
1890 
 
Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company signs a treaty with king 
Lewanika. 
1964 
 
Zimbabwe ZWE 1890 Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company arrives in the area. 1980 
 
 
Data summary 
 
 Colonized Independence 
Observations 143 143 
Min 1462 1776 
25 % quartile 1607 1948 
Median 1819 1963 
75 % quartile 1886 1978 
Max 1922 2002 
Std. Dev. 152.85 57.44 
Pearson corr.                     0.43 
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